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Causes and Implications of the U.S. Housing Crisis
Abstract
The British sometimes use the phrase “safe as houses” to describe a sure bet or an investment that
carries little to no risk. Until a few years ago, this expression held true in America as well, where housing
prices had done nothing but steadily rise since the Great Depression, and the general public considered a
home to be one of the best investments possible. As the nation headed into a new Millennium, mortgage
loans were easy to come by and housing prices soared while the economy appeared to thrive. The
government strongly encouraged Americans to own their own home, and with banks devising creative
methods to make money off mortgage loans, everyone appeared to win. However, the seemingly stable
economy was belied by the underlying fundamentals, leading to a global financial shakeup that has
changed the way we perceive the economy. This paper will trace the housing crisis to its roots and
examine how it impacted the broader American economy, bringing us to our current financial situation of
a depressed housing market and lingering unemployment.
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CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
U.S. HOUSING CRISIS
Nick Kenaga
I. INTRODUCTION
The British sometimes use the phrase
“safe as houses” to describe a sure bet or an investment that carries little to no risk. Until a few
years ago, this expression held true in America
as well, where housing prices had done nothing
but steadily rise since the Great Depression, and
the general public considered a home to be one
of the best investments possible. As the nation
headed into a new Millennium, mortgage loans
were easy to come by and housing prices soared
while the economy appeared to thrive. The government strongly encouraged Americans to own
their own home, and with banks devising creative
methods to make money off mortgage loans,
everyone appeared to win. However, the seemingly stable economy was belied by the underlying fundamentals, leading to a global financial
shakeup that has changed the way we perceive
the economy. This paper will trace the housing
crisis to its roots and examine how it impacted the
broader American economy, bringing us to our
current financial situation of a depressed housing
market and lingering unemployment.
II. BACKGROUND/CAUSES
The catalyst for the housing bust was the
vast increase in subprime mortgage loans, which
are loans given to borrowers with less than stellar
credit history. Originally considered an anomaly
within the real estate market, a multitude of factors caused the market for subprime mortgages
to grow rapidly. The first innovation that helped
spur the market’s development was the vast
technological improvement of the 1980s, which
changed the mortgage underwriting process.
Originally, the home mortgage lending business
was the responsibility of community banks. Cutand-dried formulas involving debt-to-income ratio, amount of savings in the bank, and size of the
down payment were used to determine whether
a mortgage applicant qualified for a loan. After the computer arrived on the business scene,
statisticians could analyze the vast amounts of
data on borrowers and lenders to come up with
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models for determining default risk for individual
buyers, which became known as automated
underwriting (AU). Now, rather than waiting a
week to get a loan approved, prospective borrowers could find out whether they qualified in
a matter of seconds. Furthermore, AU software
reduced underwriting costs, on average, by $916
per loan (Engel, McCoy, 2011). The decrease in
costs gave banks incentive to expand lending. It
did not yet matter to them that the AU model was
only meant to be applied to the prime mortgage
market.
In addition to the technology that was
revolutionizing the financial world, some developments were happening in the United States to
set the stage for the rise and fall of the housing
market. After the September 11 attacks and the
burst of the dot-com bubble, the U.S. entered a
recession. Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, brought the target
federal funds rate, the rate at which banks lend
to each other on the overnight market, down to
one percent in June 2003, a record low (New York
Fed). Meanwhile, trade surpluses in China and
other commodity-producing nations created an
excess of dollars in foreign countries. Much of this
excess returned to the U.S. as foreign investors
bought Treasury bonds, which are considered to
be one of the safest investments available (Zandi,
2009). This healthy demand helped to push down
yields, delivering a low return on government
bonds. Combined with abundance of cheap
credit, investors’ appetite for risk increased. Seeking to develop new types of marketable securities, financial firms increasingly began securitizing
subprime mortgage loans, and the market took
off. Sub or near-prime loans swelled from 9 percent of newly originated mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in 2001 to 40 percent in 2006 (DiMartino, Duca, 2007). As housing prices continued to
rise while inflation was kept in check, Greenspan
was lauded as a genius.
The idea to securitize mortgage loans was
hardly new. A lender would bundle their mort-
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gage loans, then repackage them as bonds that
could be rated by credit rating agencies. Then
the lender would sell the bonds—which were
backed by the mortgages as collateral—to investors. Borrowers’ mortgage payments became the
investors’ interest payments. This had been done
since the 1970s by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) that later
became private corporations. Turning mortgage
loans into bonds solved the long-time problem
that banks had of “lending long and borrowing
short”; in other words, needing to finance longterm mortgage loans with short-term demand
deposits. If interest rates rose, banks would need
to pay clients a higher rate on deposits than borrowers were paying on their fixed-rate mortgage
loans. If interest rates fell, borrowers would simply refinance at a lower rate. With securitization,
banks were less subject to interest rate fluctuations
because the mortgages were sold and passed
off to other parties. Fannie and Freddie were successful in securitizing mortgages that were originated by the lenders, but eventually, investment
banks sought to become involved in the underwriting process as well. By then, nearly everyone
who qualified for a mortgage already had one, so
the banks began securitizing subprime loans, thus
linking Wall Street with Main Street. Some of them
even began to originate their own loans, and by
2006, up to 80 percent of all subprime loans were
being securitized (Engel, McCoy, 2011). The financial intermediaries who securitized the loans
often repackaged them into collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), which separated mortgages
into separate “tranches” that allowed investors
different rates of risk and return, from AAA down
to junk status.
At the peak of the housing market in 200607, the CDOs were immensely popular, and investment banks issued over $200 billion of risky MBS
and made huge profits. Investors holding the safest tranches of CDOs could have their securities
guaranteed by a company like insurance giant
AIG, which calculated a 0.15 percent risk of loss
and insured massive quantities of CDOs by selling
what were known as credit default swaps (CDS)
(Engel, McCoy, 2011). Even after paying an insurance fee, CDO investors (mostly banks) still got a
return that easily beat that of Treasury bonds on an
investment that was thought to be equally safe.
Financial institutions that packaged the loans
reaped huge service fees that were unrelated to
the performance of the loans, so they cared little

about how risky they were. This also illustrates the
rise of the “shadow banking” industry, which is the
blending of commercial and investment banking
(Ghosh, 2011). By allowing commercial banks to
participate in underwriting and issuing of securities, they could engage in risky activities with the
funds of their depositors because they knew that
they would be backed by the FDIC, the government’s deposit insurance program. The gross lack
of checks and balances in this model began to
be exposed in 2007 as housing prices started to
go down.
III. MARKET COLLAPSE
As interest rates began to rise, the housing market finally began to cool off. When home
prices declined, many homeowners who had put
little to no money down, now had negative equity
in their homes (owing more money on their mortgage than what their homes were worth) so they
had incentive to walk away from their homes. In
addition to this, a growing number of subprime
borrowers could no longer afford their mortgage
payments, and default rates skyrocketed. The result was for prices to fall even further, along with
the value of MBS, which were derived from home
values. The new Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke,
seemed unconcerned at first, stating in June
2007 that “the troubles in the subprime section
seem unlikely to seriously spill over to the broader economy or the financial sector” (Bernanke,
2007). By March 2008, however, the U.S. was in
financial turmoil as Bear Stearns, an investment
bank that was heavily invested in the residential
mortgage market, was brought to the brink of
collapse. Financial institutions that did business
with it began withdrawing their funds, and the
Federal Reserve had to arrange for J.P. Morgan
Chase to acquire Bear Stearns for pennies on the
dollar. The balance sheets of financial firms began to deteriorate with the collapse of the housing and mortgage market. Financial firms started
deleveraging because they were afraid to lend
to each other, households, or businesses and thus
economic activity slowed down. By September,
the government announced that it was putting
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, officially taking them over. Fannie and Freddie originally had dealt mostly in prime loans, but
during the boom of the subprime market, they lost
market share to competitors that were taking on
greater risks. Also, they had been pressured by
Congress to increase their mortgage purchases
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from low-income borrowers as part of the government initiative to boost home ownership (Engel,
McCoy, 2011). When outside auditors examined
the books, they found the GSEs used accounting
tricks to hide the fact they had virtually no capital
cushion, and the government was forced to take
them over.
As the magnitude of the impending crisis
became evident, the rest of the financial institutions began to fall like dominoes. Lehman Brothers,
another bank that was loaded with “toxic assets,”
securitized loans that went sour, was brought to
the brink of failure. When it was clear that Lehman was not getting federal help, Merrill Lynch realized it too would collapse and arranged for Bank
of America to take it over. After Lehman filed
for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, markets
everywhere crashed and global financial Armageddon seemed likely. Then the Federal Reserve
spent $85 billion on a bailout of AIG, in response
to the failure of its recklessly issued credit default
swaps. Had AIG gone under, the repercussions
would have been many times worse than that of
Lehman, due to the countless banks and mutual
funds that did business with AIG and would have
instantly defaulted. In essence, it helped ameliorate financial “contagion,” in which the failure
of an important institution triggers a mass panic.
In a chaotic flight to quality, investors snapped
up Treasury securities, and the spread between
Treasury and BAA-rated corporate bonds spiked.
Shown in Figure 1, the higher the spread between
their yields, the more risk-averse investors are at
a given time. The wide yield spread illustrated
the fear that permeated the market at the time.
Then came the Congressional legislation: a $700
billion emergency bank bailout package to stabilize the financial sector. The bailout, known as
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), was the
first of many financial reforms that Congress has
passed since the crisis. In 2010, for example, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act was passed
to promote stability and increase oversight in the
financial services industry, along with protecting
the rights of consumers.
IV. AFTERMATH/POLICY MEASURES
The crisis is a reminder of the role that
asymmetric information plays in financial markets,
and in that regard can be examined for its effect
on individuals. For example, the glut of subprime
mortgages that originated during the housing
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bubble is an example of adverse selection because risks that were not creditworthy were improperly screened. The result of this is that after
the financial crisis, banks see too much risk to provide many loans, even to individuals with excellent credit. The lack of funds available to finance
economic activity explains the credit freeze, and
contributes to the difficult job market.
The behavior of the U.S. consumer also
changed greatly; before the crisis, Americans
had taken on excessive debt, as the personal savings rate fell to all-time lows (Figure 2). This leveraged consumption helped drive gross domestic
product (GDP) when the economy thrived, but
when deleveraging finally began, the lack of demand rippled through the economy. Households
also saw significant deterioration in their balance
sheets as the value of their homes, probably their
most valuable asset, plummeted. The evaporation of wealth on the housing side can be seen
in Figure 3, which indexes consumer prices (CPI),
a measure of inflation, along with housing prices
over the past decade. While the spread between
the two was significant during the peak of the
bubble, after the precipitous decline in home values the two lines converge such that the increase
in housing prices over the past decade is merely
commensurate with the rate of inflation.
Meanwhile, the Fed is still trying to exercise
its monetary policy options to help the economy.
The target federal funds rate has essentially been
zero since the end of 2008, and the Fed has conducted open market operations of buying shortterm U.S. Treasury bills to increase the money supply, both measures intended to spur economic
activity. With traditional methods seemingly exhausted, the Fed then turned to buying toxic assets off of banks’ balance sheets, hoping to recapitalize them and encourage lending. It also
has engaged in a $600 billion round of “quantitative easing,” a policy where the central bank
purchases bonds of longer maturities in order to
bring down their yields. More recently, they have
announced “Operation Twist,” a plan to sell some
of their bonds of short- or medium-term maturities
in order to buy bonds of longer maturities. With
interest rates on shorter-term bonds near zero, the
intuition is for the Fed to try to affect mortgage
rates, which are tied to the rates on longer-term
bonds, such as the 10-year Treasury. However, the
interest rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage dipped
below four percent in October 2011, a record low,

The Park Place Economist, Volume XX

Kenaga
so it is unclear if the plan will achieve its intended
effect to lower rates further.
V. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, signs of a recovery in housing are largely absent in today’s market. One of
the provisions of the Dodd-Frank bill was to give
federal bank regulators the responsibility of defining a “Qualified Residential Mortgage” or QRM.
According to the Center for Responsible Lending, the current proposal calls for a down payment of up to 20% on QRM loans, which would
become the standard for a “safe” mortgage. An
analyst for the Pacific Investment Management
Company (PIMCO) mentions this as an obstacle
to the housing market’s recovery, because fewer
people will be able to save up for a mortgage
down payment, which has tempered demand.
The lack of qualified buyers in the current housing
market, along with the excess supply, means that
the housing market appears to be depressed for
the foreseeable future.
For the broader jobs market, unemployment will be a lingering problem. Despite a corporate rebound since the financial crisis, profit
margins have been helped most by streamlining
and cost cutting rather than new hiring. Another
issue figures to be the labor force participation
rate, which is the percent of the adult population that includes itself in the labor force, that has
fallen because of discouraged workers leaving
the labor force. Figure 4 illustrates the decline of
this rate, which is at its lowest level since the early 1980s. As workers eventually reenter the work
force when aggregate economic confidence
picks up, they will put upward pressure on the unemployment rate (Tasci, Zaman, 2010). Therefore,
while the unemployment rate is off its highs from
2009 (Figure 5), it is unlikely to return to pre-crisis
levels in the foreseeable future.
Amid all of the financial reform and consumer protection legislation, along with newfound
public skepticism toward many financial institutions, the joblessness in our economy is the largest reminder of the crisis. With jobs—and industries—being shipped overseas, it will be difficult
to find the capital needed to stimulate housing
demand from its current depressed state. And
while increasing employment has been the key
focus of the policies of the Fed and Congress,
prolonged expansionary fiscal and monetary

policy can have worrying implications in the longterm. With all of the liquidity that has been added
to the economy, the M1 money stock (currency
plus demand deposits) has doubled in the last
decade (Figure 6), suggesting that inflation might
be a future concern for the economy along with
unemployment. These systemic problems in our
economy today can largely be traced to the
housing crisis and subprime mortgage bust
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APPENDIX

Fig. 1. Corporate BAA vs. 10-year Treasury Yield Spread

Fig. 2. Personal Saving Rate

44

The Park Place Economist, Volume XX

Fig. 3. Consumer Prices vs. Housing Prices

Fig. 4. Labor Force Participation Rate
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Fig. 5. U.S. Civilian Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adjusted)

Fig. 6. M1 Money Stock
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